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 The Politics of Legal Positivism: A Reply to 
David Dyzenhaus 
 
Adam Tucker 
Abstract 
David Dyzenhaus is the standard bearer of a school of thought that associates the 
philosophy of legal positivism with undesirable consequences in real life politics. This 
article examines and rejects the jurisprudential underpinnings of that enterprise. It 
IRFXVHVE\ZD\RIDFDVHVWXG\RQMXVWRQHVXEVHWRI'\]HQKDXV¶DUJXPHQWVQDPHO\
that part of his anti-positivist position that insists on a connection between legal 
positivism and legislative supremacy. 3DUW , LQWURGXFHV '\]HQKDXV¶ SRVLWLRQ Part II 
explores three arguments that Dyzenhaus develops which connect legal positivism to 
legislative supremacy, the arguments from authoritarianism, irrelevance and 
vacuity. Part III criticises two aspects of the methodology which underlies those 
arguments, its projection of prescriptive commitments onto descriptive works and the 
austerity of its conception of what counts as a properly prescriptive argument. 
I. Introduction 
David Dyzenhaus is the standard bearer of a school of thought that associates the 
philosophy of legal positivism with undesirable consequences in real life politics. The 
range, depth and influence of his work is remarkable; he has said important things 
about (inter alia) various doctrines of contemporary administrative law1, the expansion 
of exeFXWLYH SRZHU LQ WKH µZDU RQ WHUURU¶2, the judicial politics of Apartheid South 
                                                     

  50th Anniversary Research Lecturer in Law, University of York. I would like to thank 
Simon Halliday, William Lucy, Michael Stokes and two anonymous referees for 
prompting me, in various ways, to improve this article. 
1
  6HHHJ'DYLG'\]HQKDXVµForm and SubsWDQFHLQWKH5XOHRI/DZ¶ in Christopher 
Forsyth (ed), Judicial Review & The Constitution (Hart Publishing, 2000) and David 
'\]HQKDXV µAn Unfortunate Outburst of Anglo-Saxon Parochialism¶  
Modern Law Review 673. 
2
  David Dyzenhausµ+XPSW\'XPSW\5XOHVRUWKH5XOHRI/DZ/HJDO7KHRU\DQGWKH
$GMXGLFDWLRQRI1DWLRQDO6HFXULW\¶Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 
1; David Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency 
(Cambridge University Press, 20 6HH DOVR 7RP &DPSEHOO µ%ODPLQJ /HJDO
3RVLWLYLVP¶Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 31. 
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Africa3, the political legitimacy of Weimar Germany4 and the legality of the Chinese 
Canadian Head Tax5. In each of these fields (and more) Dyzenhaus often adopts the 
distinctive approach of using a critique of and hostility to the claims of legal positivism 
as the foundation for practical political and legal argument. This article examines and 
rejects the jurisprudential underpinnings of that enterprise.6 
'\]HQKDXV¶REMHFWLRQVWo legal positivism are manifold. He has argued that it is 
µGHVWUXFWLYH RI KHDOWK\ OHJDO SUDFWLFH¶7 UHVXOWV LQ µDQ XQZLWWLQJ FROODERUDWLRQ LQ DQ
DXWKRULWDULDQSROLWLFDOSURMHFW¶8 DQGLVDµVWDJQDQWUHVHDUFKSURJUDPPH«ZKLFK«QR
longer accounts appropriaWHO\IRUWKHGDWDRIOHJDOSUDFWLFH¶9 Contemporary positivism, 
KH DOOHJHV µGHFODUH>V@ LWVHOI LUUHOHYDQW WR WKH SUDFWLFH RI ODZ¶10 As a result of its 
VXSSRVHGO\µHPSW\DOPRVWSDUDGR[LFDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIOHJDOLW\DQGODZ¶VDXWKRULW\LQ
which law becomes DQLQVWUXPHQWRIWKHSRZHUIXO¶KHYHQWXUHGWRSUHGLFWµWKHGHPLVH
RIOHJDOSRVLWLYLVP¶11 This article focuses, by way of a case study, on just one subset of 
WKHVHDUJXPHQWVQDPHO\WKDWSDUWRI'\]HQKDXV¶DQWL-positivist position that insists on 
a connectLRQ EHWZHHQ OHJDO SRVLWLYLVP DQG OHJLVODWLYH VXSUHPDF\ µ3RVLWLYLVP¶
DFFRUGLQJWR'\]HQKDXVµVD\VWKDWMXGJHVVKRXOGDSSO\RQO\WKRVHYDOXHVDQGQRUPV
WKDWKDYHEHHQH[SOLFLWO\LQFRUSRUDWHGLQWRWKHODZE\VWDWXWH¶12 Or, in an alternative 
IRUPXODWLRQ µSositivism cannot supply a foundation for judicial review since it is 
SROLWLFDOO\FRPPLWWHGWRPLQLPLVLQJWKHUROHRIMXGJHVLQOHJDORUGHU¶13 Or yet another: 
µWKHSRVLWLYLVWPRGHORI WKH UXOHRI ODZ«UHJDUGV VWDWXWHVDV WKHSULPDU\ HYHQ WKH
only, legitimDWHVRXUFHRIOHJDOYDOXHV¶14 
                                                     
3
  David Dyzenhaus, Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems: South African Law in the 
Perspective of Legal Philosophy (Clarendon Press, 1991). 
4
  David Dyzenhaus, Legality and Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen, and 
Hermann Heller in Weimar (Clarendon Press, 1997). 
5
  'DYLG'\]HQKDXV µ7KH -XULVWLF)RUFHRI ,QMXVWLFH¶ LQ'DYLG'\]HQKDXV DQG0D\R
Moran (eds) Calling Power to Account: Law, Reparations and the Chinese Canadian 
Head Tax Case (University of Toronto Press, 2005). 
6
  But not, I should stress, all of the substantive political positions that this approach 
leads Dyzenhaus to adopt. Indeed, they are often attractive. My aim here is to 
highlight that the defence of those political positions needs disentangling from 
questions about the nature of law. 
7
  Dyzenhaus, above n 3, ix. 
8
  'DYLG'\]HQKDXVµ:K\3RVLWLYLVPLV$XWKRULWDULDQ¶American Journal of 
Jurisprudence 83, 112. 
9
  'DYLG '\]HQKDXV µ3RVLWLYLVP¶V 6WDJQDQW 5HVHDUFK 3URJUDPPH¶   Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 703, 704. 
10
  'DYLG'\]HQKDXVµ7KH*HQHDORJ\RI/HJDO3RVLWLYLVP¶Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 39, 67. 
11
  'DYLG '\]HQKDXV µThe Demise of Legal Positivism¶ (2006) 119 Harvard Law 
Review Forum 112, 120, 121. 
12
  Dyzenhaus, above n 5, 261. 
13
  '\]HQKDXVµ)RUPDQG6XEVWDQFH¶DERYHQ 
14
  Dyzenhaus, above n 5, 261. 
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Similar ideas appear with some regularity in the academic literature. For 
H[DPSOH LQ KLV UHYLHZ RI 1LFROD /DFH\¶V ELRJUDSK\ RI + / $ +DUW -RKQ 0LNKDLO
FRPPHQWVWKDWµWKHKXPDQULJKWVUHYROXWLRQLQFRQVWLWXWLRQDO«ODZ«ZRXOd appear 
WRKDYHVLJQLILFDQWLPSOLFDWLRQVIRUWKHWUDGLWLRQRI«MXULVSUXGHQFHZLWKZKLFK+DUW
ZDVDVVRFLDWHG¶15 Similarly, when senior judges contemplated the existence of limits 
RQ 3DUOLDPHQW¶V OHJLVODWLYH SRZHU LQ Jackson v Attorney General,16 Tom Mullen 
VXJJHVWHGWKDWLWZDVµQRWFOHDUWKDWDQ\RIWKHRSLQLRQVZKLFKVXJJHVWOLPLWDWLRQVRQ
WKH VRYHUHLJQW\ RI SDUOLDPHQW PDNH VHQVH¶ IURP WKH SHUVSHFWLYH RI +DUWLDQ OHJDO
theory.17 ,Q D VLPLODU YHLQ -HIIUH\ *ROGVZRUWK\¶V RWKHUZLVH XQUHODWHG FULWLTXH RI
scepticism about legislative intention is explicitly tangled with legal positivism through 
an introductory assertion that his argument about legislative intention µshould disturb 
legal positivists who accept the doctrine [of parliamentary sovereignty]¶ and his 
conclusion that µlegal positivists-and for that matter anyone else-who would prefer to 
steer clear of judicial supremacy over statutory law, should try to steer clear of 
skepticism about the existence and utility of legislatLYH LQWHQWLRQV DQG SXUSRVHV¶18 
Usually ² like these examples ² the suggestion is not accompanied by any 
justificatory argument. It just seems to be taken as a self-evident truth across much of 
the legal academy that there is some kind of obvious affinity between legal positivism 
and legislative supremacy. This association is presumably reinforced by the fact that 
WKH OHDGLQJ GHIHQFH RI SDUOLDPHQWDU\ VRYHUHLJQW\ -HIIUH\ *ROGZRUWK\¶V LV VHOI-
FRQVFLRXVO\ SRVLWLYLVW DQG WKH OHDGLQJ FULWLTXH RI WKH GRFWULQH 7UHYRU $OODQ¶V LV
explicitly anti-positivist. Dyzenhaus is distinctive in developing a carefully articulated 
defence of this position. The arguments he deploys are ultimately methodological; his 
reading of work in the positivist tradition imposes on it a distinctive and demanding 
methodology in order to bundle legal positivism with a substantive political 
commitment to majoritarianism. This article argues that those methodological demands 
are unsustainable.  
Presenting this argument will require me to overcome a distinctive difficulty 
with engaging with Dyzenhaus. Reading his work can be a disorienting experience as 
many of its claims are, on the face of it, surprising. It sometimes feels like the µOHJDO
SRVLWLYLVP¶KHLVDWWDFNLQJLVVRPHKRZGLIIHUHQWWRWKHµOHJDOSRVLWLYLVP¶HVSRXVHGE\
writers who understand themselves to be working within that tradition.19 The idea that 
legal positivism has an intimate connection with a commitment to an unlimited 
legislature is among these surprising claims. It is surprising because contemporary 
positivism is not characterised by any endorsement of this position. Hart, for example, 
                                                     
15
  John Mikhailµ³Plucking the Mask of Mystery from Its Face´: Jurisprudence and H 
L $+DUW¶ (2007) 95 Georgetown Law Journal 733, 750. 
16
  R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2006] 1 AC 262. 
17
  7RP0XOOHQµReflections on Jackson v Attorney General¶ (2006) 26 Legal Studies 1, 
25. 
18
  -HIIUH\ *ROGVZRUWK\ µ/HJLVODWLYH ,QWHQWLRQV /HJLVODtive Supremacy, and Legal 
3RVLWLYLVP¶San Diego Law Review 493, 493, 518. 
19
  7KH PRVW H[WUHPH H[DPSOH , DP DZDUH RI LV WKLV µ'ZRUNLQ LV D SRVLWLYLVW¶ LQ
'\]HQKDXVµ)RUPDQG6XEVWDQFH¶DERYHQQ 
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had nothing to say about the desirability of constitutional rights and Raz has even 
DUJXHG DOEHLW WHQWDWLYHO\ WKDW µLW LV ILWWLQJ WKDW WKH\ VKRXOG EH UHPRYHG IURP WKH
RUGLQDU\GHPRFUDWLFSURFHVV¶20 7KHSUREOHPVWKDWWKHVHLGLRV\QFUDVLHVLQ'\]HQKDXV¶
thought can cause were most obvious in his exchange with Matthew Kramer.21 But, as 
we will see below, this obstacle can be overcome if we are clear from the outset about 
WKHVWUXFWXUHRI'\]HQKDXV¶SRVLWLRQ,QZKDWIROORZV,SURSRVHWKHIROORZLQJRXWOLQH
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI WKH FRPPLWPHQWV ZKLFK LQWHUDFW WR JHQHUDWH '\]HQKDXV¶ DQWL-
positivism. Keeping them in mind as we assess his more concrete claims will help to 
avoid the misunderstandings that his unusual account of positivism is prone to 
SURYRNLQJ,QRXWOLQHWKHQ'\]HQKDXV¶SRVLWLRQLVVKDSHGOLNHWKLV 
1. Legal philosophy is necessarily a branch of political philosophy making 
substantive political claims that must be justified by reference to 
substantive political arguments. 
2. A properly substantive political argument has two features. First, it must be 
based in political morality. Secondly, it must be designed to influence legal 
practice. 
3. The substantive politics of legal positivism are majoritarian because, either 
a. The effect of legal positivism is to provide succour to the decision 
making of judges who show fidelity to the legislation of 
authoritarian regimes; or 
b. Legal positivism is theoretically irrelevant if it is detached from a 
political commitment to minimising the law making role of the 
judiciary; or 
c. When legal positivism parades as politically neutral, its claims are 
vacuous. In any event, they cannot be defended without resort to 
political argument. 
So the connection between legal positivism and legislative supremacy emerges 
under the aegis of claim (3). But as the next section demonstrates, none of claims (3a) 
(3b) or (3c) can be appraised without collapsing into an assessment of claims (1) and 
                                                     
20
  Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (Clarendon Press, revised ed, 2001) 57. 
21
  '\]HQKDXV DERYH Q  WKHQ 0DWWKHZ .UDPHU µ'RJPDV DQG 'LVWRUWLRQV /HJDO
3RVLWLYLVP 'HIHQGHG¶ 2001) 21 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 673, then David 
'\]HQKDXVµ&DYHDW5HYLHZHU¶2001) 21 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 703. See 
-DPHV$OODQµ$0RGHVW3URSRVDO¶2003) 23 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 97 for 
an evaluation of the exchange. The final section of this article proposes a reading of 
Dyzenhaus that Kramer did not consider.  
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(2). They presuppose these underlying methodological arguments and so depend upon 
them for their soundness. This is why the argument must move into issues in the 
methodology of jurisprudence. %XW DV '\]HQKDXV¶ PHWKRGRORJLFDO FODLPV DUH
unsustainable, his substantive claims must also fall. 
II. 7KHFROODSVHRI'\]HQKDXV¶WKLUGVWDJHDUJXPHQWV 
7KLV VHFWLRQ H[SORUHV '\]HQKDXV¶ WKUHH DUJXPHQWV SXUSRUWLQJ WR FRQQHFW OHJDO
positivism to legislative supremacy. That exploration is inconclusive, because in all 
three cases we are ultimately confronted by the need to move the argument away from 
the substance of each argument and consider instead the methodological claims on 
which they depend. 
A. THE ARGUMENT FROM AUTHORITARIANISM 
,QµWhy Positivism is Authoritarian¶22 Dyzenhaus explores the following, essentially 
consequentialist, argument against legal positivism: 
While contemporary positivists want judges and citizens not to 
be authoritarian, they offer a conception of law which as a 
matter of practice will be implemented by the judges of a wicked 
legal system in an authoritarian way.23 
This argument is developed from the Hobbesian idea that judges are obliged to 
enforce the law as it exists ² µWKH ZLOO RI WKe sovereign as he intended it to be 
H[HFXWHG¶24 So the argument from authoritarianism is simply a more specific version 
of the claim that legal positivism endorses legislative supremacy. Dyzenhaus harnesses 
the particular example of authoritarianism in a wicked legal system because this is the 
scenario that best captures the possibly deleterious consequences of encouraging the 
judiciary to simply apply the law, whatever it may be.  
Although it looks simple, the argument from authoritarianism is double edged. 
In its first guise, it is a straightforwardly consequentialist argument against legal 
positivism. In its second guise, considered below, it is a more subtle argument about 
the methodology of jurisprudence. 
The first, straightforward, version of this argument situates Dyzenhaus in an 
ongoing debate about whether the endorsement of legal positivism leads to repugnant 
RU EHQHILFLDO PRUDO FRQVHTXHQFHV '\]HQKDXV¶ SRVLWLRQ FRQWUDVWV IRU H[DPSOH ZLWK
+DUW¶V FODLP WKDW DGRSWLQJ D SRVLWLYLVW FRQFHSWLRQ RI law has beneficial moral 
consequences, notably in alerting citizens to the possibility of unjust law and so 
                                                     
22
  Dyzenhaus, above n 8. 
23
  Ibid 111. 
24
  Ibid 88. 
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priming them to resist where necessary.25 The arguments Dyzenhaus marshals in 
favour of his position, by developing a detailed case study of judicial reasoning in the 
context of the prevailing legal-philosophical climate in the South African legal system 
during apartheid, are impressively and comprehensively elaborated.26 But it is 
important to note that the whole enterprise presupposes that the consequential 
approach is an appropriate way to evaluate jurisprudential claims. From the very first 
paragraph of Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems (which reappears, reworked, as the 
opening of Why Positivism is Authoritarian), it is clear from the way that Dyzenhaus 
frames the issues he will tackle that he endorses this approach to legal philosophy: 
Like Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde legal positivism seems to lead two 
distinct lives, one virtuous and one wicked. As Jekyll, and as its 
proponents claim, legal positivism is a doctrine about the nature 
of law that, correctly understood, can only help to inculcate 
morally desirable attitudes towards the law in both judges and 
FLWL]HQV$V+\GHDQGDVLWVFULWLFVFODLPSRVLWLYLVP¶VVORJDQ«
is the legal ideology of authoritarianism.27 
So the argument from authoritarianism presupposes that it is appropriate to 
appraise legal philosophies in terms of their consequences rather than their inherent 
soundness. In this respect, Dyzenhaus endorses a position that Julie Dickson calls the 
beneficial moral consequences thesis: 
 
value judgments concerning the beneficial moral consequences 
of espousing a certain theory of law may legitimately feature in 
the criteria of success of legal theories.28 
But Dickson rejects the beneficial moral conVHTXHQFHVWKHVLVDVµDQDUJXPHQW
WKDW UXQVLQ WKHZURQJGLUHFWLRQ¶(YHQLIDWKHRU\RIODZUHVXOWV LQEHQHILFLDOPRUDO
FRQVHTXHQFHVVKHDUJXHVZHVKRXOGRQO\DFFHSWLWLILWLVWKHµcorrect way to go about 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ « ODZ¶29 This is driven by her conception of legal theory as an 
essentially descriptive enterprise: 
                                                     
25
  H L A Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 1994) 210. 
26
  See Dyzenhaus, above n 3. This approach to legal theory is perhaps vulnerable to 
criticism on grounds which I do not develop here. The remarkable case study is 
intended to supply the requisite robust and generalisable empirical evidence 
establishing the existence of the alleged connection between theory and practice. 
Dyzenhaus is less clear about the intensity of the connection between theory and 
practice that must hold for it to be conceptually significant. For discussion about 
these, and related, issues, see, eg, 'HQQLV'DYLVµ5HYLHZRI'DYLG'\]HQKDXVHard 
&DVHV LQ :LFNHG /HJDO 6\VWHPV¶ (1992) 109 South African Law Journal 157 and 
Leslie GreHQµ7KH1DWXUHRI/DZ7RGD\¶The American Political Science 
Review 206±10.  
27
  Dyzenhaus, above n 3, 1; Dyzenhaus, above n 8, 83. 
28
  Julie Dickson, Evaluation and Legal Theory (Hart Publishing, 2001) 9. 
29
  Ibid 88. 
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the task of analytical jurisprudence [is] that of attempting to 
identify and explain the nature of law. It is the character of an 
actually existing social institution which we are after, and it is a 
basic assumption of this approach that the social institution of 
law has a particular character which legal theory is attempting to 
identify and explain.30 
7KLVµEDVLFDVVXPSWLRQ¶ LVDW WKHFUX[RI WKHFRQIOLFWEHWZHHQ'\]HQKDXVDQG
descriptive legal positivism. Descriptive theorists are unconcerned whether their 
philosophy is Dr Jekyll or Mr Hyde. Rather, they understand their task to be 
uncovering descriptive truths about the nature of the social institution of law. So the 
argument from authoritarianism will not impress a descriptive theorist because 
consequentialist considerations do not feature in his criteria for the success of a theory 
of law. From his perspective, the claims he supports are to be evaluated not by the 
consequences of expressing them, but on the basis of their truth or falsity. And 
'\]HQKDXV¶ DUJXPHQW GRHV QRW RSHUDWH RQ WKLV SODQH &RQVLGHU IRU H[DPSOH WKH
FKDUDFWHULVWLFDOO\SRVLWLYLVWFODLPWKDWGRPLQDWHV'\]HQKDXV¶FULWLTXHRISRVLWLYLVP² 
that there will arise cases in which the result is not determined by law, and so judges 
exercise a discretionary law making power in order to decide one way or the other31. 
Consequentialist arguments will make no sense to a theorist who offers this claim 
descriptively because from his perspective, it is true regardless of the consequences 
that flow from its truth.32 So, faced with the argument from authoritarianism, our 
descriptive theorist must choose between two possible responses. 
)LUVWVXSSRVH WKH MXGJHVKDYH WRERUURZ'\]HQKDXV¶ WHUPLQRORJ\ µFRUUHFWO\
XQGHUVWRRG¶ WKH FODLP WKDW WKH\ H[HUFLVH D ODZ PDNLQJ SRZHU LQ WKH HYHQW RI
indeterminacy. The argument from authoritarianism tells us that this will encourage 
WKHP WRFKDQJH WKHLUEHKDYLRXUIRU WKHZRUVHEHFDXVH WKLVPDNHV µWKHRQO\VHQse of 
OHJDOSRVLWLYLVPZKLFKLWLVSRVVLEOHIRUMXGJHVWRPDNH¶33 
(YHQLIZHJUDQW'\]HQKDXV¶DUJXPHQWDQGDOORZWKDWWKLVFKDQJHLQEHKDYLRXU
occurs, then from the descriptivist perspective it is still not clear how legal positivism 
is to blame. The changHLVJURXQGHGLQWKHMXGJHV¶SROLWLFDOYLHZVRQWKHDSSURSULDWH
exercise of what they have now found out amounts to a law-making power. If those 
views lead them to behave in an authoritarian fashion, or display an excess of 
deference to the legislature, then that is because they hold sceptical views as to the 
legitimacy of judicial law making. Dyzenhaus is alert to this objection and responds 
with an argument based on the capacity of rival understandings of legal positivism to 
                                                     
30
  Ibid 89. 
31
  See Hart, above n 25, ch 7. 
32
  &I'ZRUNLQ¶VµWZRREMHFWLRQVWRMXGLFLDORULJLQDOLW\¶QDPHO\WKDWLWLVXQGHPRFUDWLF
and violates the rule or law ² both consequentialist objections to a descriptive claim. 
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, 1977) 84. 
33
  Dyzenhaus, above n 8, 85. 
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µLQIRUP MXGLFLDO DFWLYLW\¶34 But this simply reopens the methodological problem, 
because it presupposes that it is appropriate to evaluate legal positivism in terms of its 
ability to inform judicial behaviour. he descriptivist, who aims only to explain that 
behaviour as best he can, wiOOQRWUHFRJQLVHWKHIRUFHRI'\]HQKDXV¶SRVLWLRQ7KHRQO\
µVROXWLRQ¶WKDWZLOOSUHVHQWLWVHOI WRWKHGHVFULSWLYHWKHRULVWLIH[SRVLQJWKHLUWUXWKKDV
repugnant consequences is to keep that truth secret. But this is hardly an appealing 
position to adopt, and it clearly is not endorsed by Dyzenhaus who has gone to great 
lengths to expose, persistently, what he views to be an objectionable argument. 
Alternatively, suppose the change in behaviour that Dyzenhaus detects in judges 
exposed to legal positivism arLVHV EHFDXVH WKH\ KDYH µLQFRUUHFWO\ XQGHUVWRRG¶ LWV
claims. Surely the mistaken judge, or whoever happened to mislead them, is to blame. 
+HUH'\]HQKDXV¶DUJXPHQWWKDWOHJDOSKLORVRSKLHVRQO\PDNHVHQVHWRMXGJHVLQWHUPV
RIWKHZD\LQZKLFKWKH\µLQIRUPMXGLFLDODFWLYLW\¶35 becomes especially relevant. The 
descriptive theorist does not intend his claims to inform judicial behaviour beyond 
perhaps giving them a greater understanding of the task they are already undertaking. 
But by persistently arguing that their claims only make sense when read prescriptively, 
DQG E\ LQVLVWLQJ WKDW µFRPSOHWH WKHRULHV RI ODZ¶ SURYLGH D µZD\ RI UHVROYLQJ KDUG
FDVHV¶ '\]HQKDXV¶ MXULVSUXGHQFH LV LURQLFDOO\ D FOHDU FRQWHQGHU DV D PLVOHDGLQJ
LQIOXHQFH WKDW PLJKW OHDG MXGJHV WR µLQFRUUHFWO\ XQGHUVWDQG¶ WKH FODLPV RI WKH
descriptive theorist in the first place. 
Now, none of this is supposed to hit the substance of the argument from 
authoritarianism. But it should be clear by now that this argument only has any 
purchase if it is appropriate to assess the claims of legal positivism consequentially, or 
if legal philosophies are to be understood as attempts to inform judicial behaviour in 
hard cases. And as Dyzenhaus and the descriptive theorist differ on this fundamental 
underlying point the argument from authoritarianism, understood as a straightforward 
argument against legal positivism, cannot be assessed without first considering the 
underlying conception of legal philosophy as a prescriptive enterprise that it 
presupposes. 
In its second guise, the argument from authoritarianism is presented as if it 
contributes to this very issue. In this, more subtle, guise Dyzenhaus deploys the 
argument from authoritarianism as a contribution to this deeper, methodological 
debate. It is, he claims, itself evidence that the descriptive theorist is mistaken, and 
should move onto prescriptive ground: 
,WLVSDUWRI'ZRUNLQ¶V«DFFRPSOLVKPHQWWRKDYHDWWHPSWHGWR
restore legal philosophy to an examination of its proper, 
pragmatic roots by reuniting the central questions of legal and 
SROLWLFDO SKLORVRSK\ « >7@KH FRVW IRU FRQWHPSRUDU\ SRVLWLYLVWV
of resisting this attempt is an unwitting collaboration in an 
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  Dyzenhaus, above n 8, 85±6. 
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authoritarian political project of which they should want no 
part.36 
Unfortunately, however, this attempt to harness the argument from 
authoritarianism in the methodological debate between prescriptive and descriptive 
theory must fail. In its first guise, it is potentially compelling, just in case it is 
appropriate to assess legal philosophies in terms of their consequences. But in this 
second guise, it argues that contemporary positivists should adopt a prescriptive 
methodology in order to avoid the bad consequences of their descriptive methodology. 
But this presupposes that worrying about consequences is the appropriate way to 
choose between legal philosophies in order to argue that this is in fact the appropriate 
way to choose. In short, it is question begging. The only form in which the argument 
from authoritarianism can succeed is in its first form. And in that form, appraisal of its 
success ultimately collapses into an underlying methodological argument about the 
QDWXUHRIMXULVSUXGHQFH:HZLOOUHWXUQWRWKDWGHEDWHDQG'\]HQKDXV¶SRVLWLRQZLWKLQ
it after considering two further arguments that he levels at legal positivism. 
B. THE ARGUMENT(S) FROM IRRELEVANCE 
,Qµ3RVLWLYLVP¶V6WDJQDQW5HVHDUFK3URJUDPPH¶37 Dyzenhaus develops two arguments 
DJDLQVWOHJDOSRVLWLYLVPWKDWWXUQRQDQDOOHJDWLRQRIµLUUHOHYDQFH¶7KH\DUHQRWQHDWO\
delineated by Dyzenhaus so they need disentangling from one another before the 
importance of the second argument from irrelevance can become clear. Both focus on 
the positivist claim that judges in hard cases exercise a discretion to make new law 
rather than determine pre-existing legal rights and duties. Before we consider the detail 
RI'\]HQKDXV¶DUJXPHQWLWVFRQQHFWLRQZLWKOHJLVODWLYHVXSUHPDF\FDQEHDQWLFLSDWHG
IURP WKH RXWVHW D µUHOHYDQW¶ IRUP RI OHJDO SRVLWLYLVP ZRXOG UHFRQQHFW ZLWK LWV
Hobbesian roots and advocate reform to minimise judicial law-making in favour of the 
will of the legislature. 
The first argument from irrelevance takes Hart as its focus. Dyzenhaus sees the 
value-ODGHQQDWXUHRIWKHSUDFWLFHRIDGMXGLFDWLRQDVDQµDQRPDO\¶IRUOHJDOSRVLWLYLVP
and interpretV +DUW¶V ZRUN RQ LQGHWHUPLQDF\ DV KLV UHVSRQVH WR WKDW DQRPDO\ %XW
+DUW¶VVROXWLRQGRHVQRW VDWLVI\'\]HQKDXV)RUKLP µWKHZD\ LQZKLFK+DUW
V OHJDO
SRVLWLYLVP GHDOV ZLWK WKH DSSDUHQW DQRPDO\ « LV WR VXJJHVW WKH LUUHOHYDQFH RI WKDW
practice to its thesiV¶38 If true, this would be a serious problem for legal positivism; a 
WKHRU\ RI ODZ WKDW UHDFWHG WR DQ µDSSDUHQW DQRPDO\¶ E\ EUDQGLQJ WKH SUDFWLFH RI
adjudication as irrelevant to the nature of law would indeed be deficient. Furthermore, 
in contrast to the argument from authoritarianism, it looks like an argument with which 
the descriptive theorist can engage. It is a straightforward claim that positivism ² even 
in descriptive mode ² cannot accommodate a central feature (adjudication) of the 
phenomenon it purports to explain (law). 
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%XW WKLV DUJXPHQW IDLOV EHFDXVH +DUW¶V GLVFUHWLRQ WKHVLV LV QHLWKHU D IDLOXUH WR
deal with the practice of adjudication nor an attempt to exclude it from the domain of 
legal theory. On the contrary, it is a substantive attempt to deal with the practice by 
suggesting that it is in the nature of law that judges sometimes act as lawmakers. And 
Hart defended it at length in The Concept of Law, hardly an indication that he believes 
the explanation of judicial discretion to be outside the purview of legal theory.39 That 
judges act as lawmakers in no way entails that adjudication is irrelevant to legal 
SRVLWLYLVP'\]HQKDXV¶DUJXPHQWGRHVRIFRXUVHPDNHVHQVHLILWLVSUHVXSSRVHGWKDW
WKH WDVN RI OHJDO WKHRU\ LV WR H[SODLQ ZK\ MXGJHV¶ SURnouncements are authoritative 
statements of pre-existing rights and duties. But Hart is interested in the prior question 
of whether MXGJHV¶SURQRXQFHPHQWVKDYHWKLVFKDUDFWHUDQGLWLVE\IDLOLQJWRDQVZHULW
in the affirmative that he comes into conflict with Dyzenhaus. So the conception of 
OHJDO WKHRU\ LPSOLFLW LQ'\]HQKDXV¶DUJXPHQWE\SDVVHV WKHYHU\TXHVWLRQ WKDW+DUW¶V
work on judicial discretion is supposed to answer ² whether or not judicial decisions 
in hard cases are best understood as the determination of pre-existing rights and duties, 
or the creation of new ones. Dyzenhaus is, of course, at liberty to disagree with Hart on 
this point. But the only way to establish that disagreement is to argue that Hart is 
wrong.40 Instead, he argues by simple stiSXODWLRQWKDW+DUW¶VDUJXPHQWLVDIIOLFWHGZLWK
a kind of theoretical illegitimacy. 
The second argument from irrelevance takes what Dyzenhaus describes as 
µ5D]¶V VHQVH WKDW MXGJHV DUH IXOO\ FRQVWUDLQHG E\ OHJDO DXWKRULW\ RQO\ ZKHQ WKHLU
judgments about thH ODZ DUH QRW HYDOXDWLYH¶41 as its focus. This, Dyzenhaus argues, 
OHDGV5D]WRWKHFRQFOXVLRQWKDWµPXFKRIWKHSUDFWLFHRIODZLVGRQHRXWVLGHWKHVFRSH
RI DXWKRULW\¶ D FRQFOXVLRQ WKDW '\]HQKDXV ILQGV µSHFXOLDU¶ 7KH LPSDFW RI WKLV
argument is hard to pin down, as its FKDUDFWHULVDWLRQRI5D]¶VSRVLWLRQ seems to use the 
language of authority in a way that Raz would not. %XW, WDNHLWWKDWE\µRXWVLGHWKH
VFRSH RI DXWKRULW\¶ '\]HQKDXV PHDQV VRPHWKLQJ OLNH µXQFRQVWUDLQHG E\ OHJDO
DXWKRULW\¶42 At first glance, this argument seems to suffer the same problem as that 
FRQVLGHUHGDERYH,WLVWHPSWLQJWRUHVSRQGWKDW5D]¶VFRQFOXVLRQLVRQO\µSHFXOLDU¶LQ
WKH OLJKW RI DQ LQLWLDO DVVXPSWLRQ WKDW DOO MXGLFLDO EHKDYLRXU ZLOO RSHUDWH ZLWKLQ µWKH
VFRSHRIDXWKRULW\¶And this assumption would beg the very question that Raz ² like 
Hart before him ² ZDV WDFNOLQJ %XW '\]HQKDXV¶ H[SODQDWLRQ RI WKH DOOHJHG
peculiarity reveals that this second argument from irrelevance is richer than the first. 
                                                     
39
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+HILQGV5D]¶VFODLPDERXWGLVFUHWLRQSHFXOLDUEHFDXVHµWKHVXEVWDQFHLQWKH«WKHRU\
FRQGHPQVLWWRSUDFWLFDOLUUHOHYDQFH¶$OWKRXJKKHGRHVQRWHPSKDVLVHWKHGLVWLQFWLRQ
notice that the notion of irrelevance is playing a fundamentally different argumentative 
role here to that which it played in the first argument from irrelevance, above, because 
its place in the argument has been reversed: the first argument was about the relevance 
of practice to theory whereas this second argument is about the relevance of theory to 
practice. But tKHPHDVXUHRI µUHOHYDQFH WRSUDFWLFH¶XSRQZKLFK'\]HQKDXV UHOLHV LV
surprisingly demanding. He unpacks it, during the course of the article, by constructing 
a fictional controversy against which the success of legal positivism can be assessed: 
Suppose thaW WKH « SRVLWLYLVW ILQGV WKDW MXGJHV LQ D SDUWLFXODU
legal order divide between those who adopt a positivistic 
account of legal authority, in which valid law is the law 
established in accordance with the Identification Thesis, and 
those who adopt a Dworkinian account, in which authority 
accrues only to those statements of the law which are supported 
by a moral theory which justifies them.43 
$WWKLVILUVWVWDJH'\]HQKDXVLPSOLHVWKDWWKHSRVLWLYLVWLVµUHGXFHGWRUHSRUWLQJ
WKDW«WKHUHLVFRQWURYHUV\DERXWWKHQDWXUHRIOHJDODXWKRULW\¶1RWHWKDWDOUHDG\WKLV
is a puzzling misrepresentation of the positivist position. In the conditions Dyzenhaus 
stipulates, the positivist does not merely report the controversy; he quite obviously also 
takes a stance on which set of judges has the soundest understanding of the nature of 
ODZ0RUHSUHFLVHO\KHGLVDJUHHVZLWK'\]HQKDXV¶ILFWLRQDOµ'ZRUNLQLDQ¶MXGJHDERXW
the nature of law. So, in addition to reporting the controversy, he maintains that one 
side is mistaken. 
Ne[W '\]HQKDXV H[SDQGV WKH SRVLWLRQ DGRSWHG E\ KLV ILFWLRQDO µSRVLWLYLVW¶
judges by revisiting the position staked out in the argument from authoritarianism: he 
says they endorse a moral duty to obey the law, whatever its content, direct their 
decisions accRUGLQJO\ DQG µDGRSW D YHU\ FRQVHUYDWLYH YLHZ RI WKHLU UROH¶44 This 
GHYHORSPHQW LV GHVLJQHG WR FRPSRXQG WKH SRVLWLYLVW¶V GLVDJUHHPHQW ZLWK RXU
SURWDJRQLVWV1RZWKHSRVLWLYLVWZLOODOVRGLVDJUHHZLWKWKHµSRVLWLYLVW¶MXGJHEHFDXVH
of his newly conjured authoritarian leaning. And so, with nothing critical to say to 
HLWKHU MXGJH '\]HQKDXV DUJXHV SRVLWLYLVP µOHDYHV WKH WHUUDLQ RI DGMXGLFDWLRQ WR EH
FRQWHVWHG EHWZHHQ ERWK NLQGV RI MXGJHV¶ WR ZKRP LW KDV QRWKLQJ FULWLFDO WR VD\¶45 
Immediately, it seems odd that Dyzenhaus designs a story in which the positivist 
disagrees with all the judges in order to claim that he has nothing critical to say to any 
of them. It would certainly seem more likely that the positivist has something critical to 
say to all as opposed WR QRQH RI '\]HQKDXV¶ MXGJHV 7KLV SRLQW LV GHYHORSHG E\
Kramer: 
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If I say to those judges that their reasons for adopting their 
adjudicative posture are grounded in a fallacy, am I not saying 
something critical to them?46 
Furthermore, Kramer is trenchantly FULWLFDO RI WKH '\]HQKDXV¶ µSRVLWLYLVW¶
MXGJHV +H GHVFULEHV WKHP DV µGLVPD\LQJO\ ZRRGHQ¶ µEHQLJKWHG¶47 µULGLFXORXV¶ DQG
µSRWHQWLDOO\GDQJHURXV¶48 And this criticism is hardly surprising as it is exactly what 
Dyzenhaus scenario was designed to provoke. What, then, is this argument supposed 
WR DFKLHYH" 7KH DQVZHU OLHV LQ '\]HQKDXV¶ GLVWLQFWLYH GHPDQGV DERXW WKH NLQG RI
things a theorist should say to a judge. He expects positivism not only to disagree with 
them about abstract questions about the nature of law, but also about the way in which 
they decide cases: 
Positivism presents a theory of law, not a theory of adjudication, 
though its theory of law has consequences for any theory of 
adjudication ² it is about how judges should exercise their 
discretion.49 
1RZ WKH VKDSH RI WKH µSUDFWLFDO LUUHOHYDQFH¶ IRU ZKLFK '\]HQKDXV DWWDFNV
positivism comes into view. Dyzenhaus requires that the positivist disagreement with 
his judges be capable of expression in the form of a dispute with the judges about what 
decisions they should actually come to in concrete cases. But this requirement has no 
purchase from a descriptive perspective. The descriptive theorist claims simply that 
judges exercise a law making power. Of course he is free to move on and issue 
recommendations as to how this power should be exercised, recommendations that will 
be external to his legal positivism. But for Dyzenhaus this does not suffice. For him, 
these recommendations should be internal to and informed by the positivist aspect of 
WKHWKHRULVW¶VDSproach. They should be made as claims about the nature of law, rather 
than as claims made as a consequence of a logically prior insight about the nature of 
law. Yet this is the very type of claim that the descriptive positivist resists. Nowhere is 
this cleDUHU WKDQZKHQ'\]HQKDXVEHUDWHV5D]¶V LQVLVWHQFH WKDW MXGJHVGRPRUH WKDQ
find pre-existing law: 
The triumph of methodology over substance is signalled when in 
SODFHRIDGYRFDWLQJUHIRUPWREULQJSDUWLFLSDQWV¶DFWLYLW\ZLWKLQ
the scope of authority, one simply designates their activity as 
outside that scope.50 
To a descriptive theorist, this argument is incoherent. Even if he were so 
LQFOLQHG LW ZRXOG EH LPSRVVLEOH IRU 5D] WR DGYRFDWH UHIRUP WR FXUWDLO MXGJHV¶ ODZ-
making activities without first designating them as such. Without the prior 
µGHVLJQDWLRQ¶ RU LGHQWLILFDWLRQ RI D SRVVLEOH SUREOHP WKHUH ZRXOG EH QRWKLQJ IRU
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reform to target. A measure of relevance that demands recommendations for reform to 
be bundled with the description of the phenomenon in need of reform can have no 
purchase with such a descriptive theorist. And, as this is the very measure of relevance 
LQSOD\LQ'\]HQKDXV¶VHFRQGDUJXPHQWIURPLUUHOHYDQFHWKDWDUJXPHQWLVHIIHFWLYHO\
meaningless for the very theorists to whom it is addressed. The argument from 
irrelevance depends on the conception of jurisprudence it presupposes. So, again, our 
appraisal of its success ultimately collapses into the underlying methodological 
argument about the nature of jurisprudence. 
C. THE ARGUMENT(S) FROM VACUITY 
In The Genealogy of Legal Positivism, '\]HQKDXV DUJXHV WKDW µSRVLWLYLVP LV EHVW
XQGHUVWRRG DV SROLWLFDOO\ SUHVFULSWLYH¶ RQ WKH JURXQGV WKDW µDQ\ RI WKH PDUNV RI
SRVLWLYLVPDVDGLVWLQFWWKHRU\«RIODZDUHPDUNVLQKHULWHGIURPDSROLWLFDOWUDGLWLRQ 
DQGZKLFKFDQEHGHWDFKHGIURPWKDWWUDGLWLRQRQO\RQSDLQRIYDFXLW\¶51 
His argument for this position has a complex structure. It consists in a 
µJHQHDORJLFDO UHFRQVWUXFWLRQRI WKHWUDGLWLRQ¶ZKLFKUXQVIURP+REEHVWRWKHSUHVHQW
day and identifies and cXOPLQDWHVLQDQDWWDFNRQDVKLIWIURPSRVLWLYLVP¶VSUHVFULSWLYH
origins to the descriptivism of (much) contemporary positivism. This shift, Dyzenhaus 
DUJXHVFDQEHWUDFHGWR$XVWLQZKRµGRHVQRWVHHPWRXQGHUVWDQGWKHPHWKRGRORJ\RI
legal theory as poliWLFDO¶52 DQG PRUH VLJQLILFDQWO\ +DUW IRU ZKRP µSRVLWLYLVP LV
FRPPLWWHGWRSURYLGLQJDJHQHUDOWKHRU\RIODZRQYDOXHQHXWUDOGHVFULSWLYHJURXQG¶
ZKLOVW UHPDLQLQJ µPRUDOO\ DQG SROLWLFDOO\ DJQRVWLF¶53 Importantly, the prescriptive 
commitment that contemporary positivists are said to have dropped equates to a 
FRPPLWPHQW WR OHJLVODWLYH VXSUHPDF\ +REEHV¶ DQG %HQWKDP¶V WKHRULHV KH QRWHV
µUHTXLUHWKDWWKHUHEHbut one source of law ² sovereign will ² and that that source 
manifest its judgments in the form best suited to transmitting determinate judgments 
about the public good from ruler to subject ² VWDWXWHV¶54 $QGIRU WKHPµ[p]ositive 
ODZ SURSHUO\ VR FDOOHG LV« ODZ ZKRVH FRQWHQW LV GHWHUPLQDEOH E\ « WHVWV ZKLFK
appeal only to facts about legislative LQWHQWLRQ¶55 Whilst (many) contemporary 
positivists have apparently abandoned this political commitment, Dyzenhaus again 
HYRNHV WKH SRVVLELOLW\ RI ILFWLRQDO µSRVLWLYLVW MXGJHV¶ ZKR UHPDLQ IDLWKIXO WR LW
µ3RVLWLYLVWMXGJHV«ZLOODFFHSWRQHRURWKHU«Solitical arguments for the legitimacy 
of the constitutional arrangement whereby parliament has a monopoly on law-making 
SRZHU¶56 
In summary, then, the argument claims that positivism is vacuous when 
detached from a political commitment to legislative supremacy. But what does it mean 
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to accuse a legal theory of vacuity? The relationship between them is not entirely clear, 
but it seems that there are three senses of vacuity at stake.57 So there are actually three 
arguments from vacuity to consider. 
The first aUJXPHQW LV DLPHG DW µLQFOXVLYH¶ OHJDO SRVLWLYLVP ,Q UHVSRQVH WR
'ZRUNLQ¶VFULWLTXHRI+DUWLQFOXVLYHOHJDOSRVLWLYLVWVFRQFHGHWKDWPRUDOVWDQGDUGVFDQ
feature in the criteria of legal validity.58 It is common to encounter the concern that this 
concession deprives inclusive legal positivism of its distinctiveness.59 The first 
DUJXPHQWIURPYDFXLW\LV'\]HQKDXV¶YHUVLRQRIWKLVFRQFHUQ 
All that binds [inclusive positivists to their] tradition is a 
preamble to their theory that all legal values have their source in 
social practices and that social practices give rise to morally 
repugnant values, so that the presence of morality is a matter of 
historical and political contingency. That preamble is vacuous 
because no-one could deny it.60 
Here, then, vacuous means undeniable. At first glance this is extremely 
surprising, as it looks like a concession that the claims of the inclusive legal positivists 
are true! In any event, the position he describes is not vacuous in the sense he claims. It 
is, for example, antithetical to the legal theory of Ronald Dworkin, who denies both 
OLPEVRIWKHSXUSRUWHGO\XQGHQLDEOHSUHDPEOH)RUKLPOHJDOYDOXHVGRQRWµKDYHWKHLU
VRXUFH LQ VRFLDO SUDFWLFHV¶ 5DWKHU ODZ DV DQ LQWHUSUHWLYH SUDFWLFH VHUYHV VRPH
logically prior value µWKDWFDQEHVWDWHGLQGHSHQGHQWO\RIMXVWGHVFULELQJWKHUXOHVWKDW
PDNH XS WKH SUDFWLFH¶61 )XUWKHUPRUH WKH µSUHVHQFH RI PRUDOLW\¶ LQ ODZ LV QR PHUH
matter of historical and political contingency for Dworkin. Whatever the independent 
prior value turns out WREH µWKH ODZRIDFRPPXQLW\«LV WKHVFKHPHRIULJKWVDQG
FRPPXQLWLHV WKDW PHHW WKDW « VWDQGDUG¶62 On this account, morality is intertwined 
ZLWK ODZ LQ D ZD\ WKDW LV LQFRPSDWLEOH ZLWK '\]HQKDXV¶ VXPPDU\ RI WKH LQFOXVLYH
positivist position. The second half of that summary gestures towards the distinctively 
positivist kernel of inclusive legal positivism ² a commitment to the claim that it is 
entirely contingent whether a legal system incorporates morally attractive or morally 
repugnant norms. And this too is far from undeniable. Gustav Radbruch, for example, 
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  $OWKRXJK'\]HQKDXVVXPPDULVHVWKDWWKHYDFXLW\LQTXHVWLRQµWDNHVWZRIRUPV¶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60±1.  
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  See, eg, W J Waluchow, Inclusive Legal Positivism (Oxford University Press, 1994); 
-XOHV &ROHPDQ µNegative and Positive Positivism¶ (1982) 11 Journal of Legal 
Studies 139; and Hart, above n 25, 250±54. 
59
  'ZRUNLQIRUH[DPSOHFODLPHGWKDWKHIRXQGLWµhard to see any genuine difference¶
EHWZHHQ&ROHPDQ¶VYHUVLRQRILQFOXVLYHOHJDOSRVLWLYLVPDQGKLVRZQOHJDOWKHRU\
Ronald 'ZRUNLQ µ7KLUW\ <HDUV OQ¶   Harvard Law Review 1655, 1656. 
)RUDGLVFXVVLRQRIVRPHµTXHVWLRQVDERXWLWV«GLVWLQFWLYHQHVV¶VHHDOVR%ULDQBix, 
µ3DWUROOLng the Boundaries: Inclusive Legal Positivism and the Nature of 
-XULVSUXGHQWLDO'HEDWH¶Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 17. 
60
  Dyzenhaus, above n 10, 55. 
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  Ronald Dworkin, /DZ¶V(PSLUH (Hart Publishing, 1986) 47. 
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  Ibid 93. 
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DUJXHV WKDW µZKHUHHTXDOLW\«LVFRQVFLRXVO\GHQLHG LQ WKHFUHDWLRQRISRVLWLYH ODZ
WKHQ WKH ODZ«HQWLUHO\ ORVHV LWV FKDUDFWHUDV ODZ¶63 His formula has recently been 
endorsed by Julian Rivers and defended by Robert Alexy.64 In any event it would be 
surprising if this were the sense in which Dyzenhaus meant to establish the vacuity of 
contemporary legal positivism without a commitment to legislative supremacy. To 
argue that legal positivism without that commitment was undeniable would be a truly 
remarkable position for a critic to adopt. And, unsurprisingly, the other two senses of 
vacuity he deploys are more meaningful. 
In the second argument from vacuity, Dyzenhaus turns his attention to exclusive 
legal positivism. In contrast to inclusive legal positivists, exclusive legal positivists 
maintain that moral standards cannot feature in the criteria of legal validity. Dyzenhaus 
objects that this is: 
of little assistance to judges in a common law legal orGHU«$OO
WKH H[FOXVLYH OHJDO SRVLWLYLVW FDQ VD\ WR « MXGJHV >LQ
jurisdictions with a bill of rights] is that they have discretion and 
that they should describe most of what they do in Austinian, 
quasi-legislative language. Here the kind of vacuity in issue is 
the virtual irrelevance of theory to practice.65 
In a footnote to the above passage, Dyzenhaus confirms that the specific feature 
RIH[FOXVLYHSRVLWLYLVPWKDWKHLVWDUJHWLQJLVZKDW-RKQ*DUGQHUFDOOVLWVµQRUPDWLYH
LQHUWQHVV¶ ² the fact that it doesn¶W WHOO SHRSOH ZKDW WKH\ RXJKW WRGR LQ DQ\ JLYHQ
situation.66 Note that this is a return to the argument from irrelevance. 
2IWKHWKUHHVHQVHVRIYDFXLW\LQ'\]HQKDXV¶DUJXPHQWWKHQLWLVWKHWKLUGWKDW
represents the most interesting and novel claim. It consists in the complaint that: 
Both kinds of descriptive positivists find themselves retreating to 
some high ground about the very nature of law, unanswerable to 
experience and practice because of their political purity.67 
Whilst, at first glance, this also looks like a return to the argument from 
LUUHOHYDQFHLW LVDFWXDOO\VXEWO\GLIIHUHQW'\]HQKDXV¶FRQFHUQ LVZLWKMXULVSUXGHQWLDO
conclusions that differ from the beliefs of participants in legal practice; his main 
example of this kind of situation is tKHDSSDUHQWFODVKEHWZHHQWKHSRVLWLYLVWV¶FODLP
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  The traQVODWLRQKHUHLVWDNHQIURPWKHWH[WRI-XOLDQ5LYHUVµGross Statutory Injustice 
DQGWKH+HDG7D[&DVH¶ in Dyzenhaus and Moran (eds), above n 5, 237. 
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  )RU5LYHUV¶ HQGRUVHPHQW VHH5LYHUV DERYHQ 63 )RU$OH[\¶VGHIHQFH VHH 5REHUW
$OH[\µ$'HIHQFHRI5DGEUXFK¶VFormula¶ in David Dyzenhaus (ed), Recrafting the 
Rule of Law (Hart Publishing, 1999). 
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  Dyzenhaus, above n 10, 60±1. 
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  See ibid n 61, where Dyzenhaus PDNHV H[SOLFLW WKH FODLP WKDW µLQHUWQHVV LV UHDOO\
YDFXLW\¶ *DUGQHU¶V GLVFXVVLRQ RI QRUPDWLYH LQHUWQHVV LV LQ -RKQ *DUGQHU µ/HJDO
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ò0\WKV¶ (2001) 46 American Journal of Jurisprudence 199, 202±3. 
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  Dyzenhaus, above n 10, 61. 
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that judges exercise a law-making power in hard cases and the understanding of some 
judges, especially in common-law jurisdictions, who themselves believe that their role 
consists in finding pre-existing law rather than making new law.68 The third argument 
from vacuity is the allegation that in these circumstances positivists cannot properly 
persuade the practitioner of their mistake; rather they are reduced to vacuous assertions 
that they are right and the participants are wrong, because they are unable to justify 
WKHLULQVLVWHQFHWKDWWKHVHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶EHOLHIVVKRXOGEHUHMHFWHG  
such insistence requires an explanation, which is not 
forthcoming from such legal positivists because its only source 
is the kind of genealogical argument which they need to resist.69 
The two parts of his claim break down as follows. First, legal positivists do not 
offer an explanation why the opinion of a judge who believes he finds, rather than 
makes law, should be rejected. Secondly, the reason that they fail to explain is that the 
only possible kind of explanation is political, and legal positivists deny themselves 
recourse to such arguments.70 
The flaw with this argument lies in the first part, which is straightforwardly 
false. Contemporary legal positivists are united around and vocal in expressing their 
reason for rejecting the position of anyone ² including judges ² who claims that 
judges find rather than make the answer in hard cases. Indeed, whilst they might not 
have actually addressed their arguments at judges (real or imaginary) who hold this 
position, a significant amount of positivist theorising from the past fifty years makes 
some kind of contribution to this issue. The reasons around which they are united are, 
firstly, that there is a fact of the matter on this question and, secondly, that those who 
hold that position (whether philosopher, practitioner, judge or layman) are quite simply 
wrong about this feature of the nature of law. Different writers may offer different 
reasons. Their reasons may not even be mutually compatible. But the suggestion that 
they have no explanation at all is quite simply unsustainable. This should mean that the 
second part of the argument ² '\]HQKDXV¶ SURSRVHG UHDVRQ ZK\ SRVLWLYLVWV KDYH
failed to explain themselves ² is otiose, which in a sense it is. But it is also telling, as 
the next stage in his discussion highlights. 
Dyzenhaus proceeds ² immediately ± to consider the following example: 
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  Note that he stipulates the existence of these judges. 
69
  Dyzenhaus, above n 10, 55. 
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  0\H[SDQVLRQRIWKHVHFRQGOLPERIWKHDUJXPHQWJORVVHVWKHRULJLQDOµJHQHDORJLFDO¶
DV µSROLWLFDO¶6WULFWO\ VSHDNLQJ'\]HQKDXV¶RULJLQDO IRUPXODWLRQDSSHDUV WR LPSRVH
onerous restrictions on the range of political commitments that could ground legal 
positivism, restricting them to those held by earlier positivists, which would exclude 
the possibility that alternative or rival political commitments also lead to legal 
positivism. This strikes me as a separate, and mistaken, point. It does not, however, 
seem to be a simple slip, as Dyzenhaus repeats the same formulation in his 
subsequent discussion of theories of authority. See below n 74. 
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Joseph Raz ... denies that judges who operate within the 
conceptual space of the common law style have a correct 
understanding of their practice. That denial seems premised on 
an argument about the very nature of authority: it is in the very 
nature of authority that the content of an authoritative directive 
can be determined in accordance with the Sources Thesis. But 
that argument looks suspiciously circular, especially given the 
political origins of the Identification Thesis from which the 
Sources Thesis descends, and the fact that the account of 
authority in which the argument is nested is one of the bones of 
contention within both legal theory and legal practice.71 
%\µMXGJHVZKRRSHUDWHZLWKLQWKHFRQFHSWXDOVSDFHRIWKHFRPPRQODZVW\OH¶
Dyzenhaus means judges who believe that in hard cases they discover µZKDWWKHODZ
ERWK PRUDOO\ DQG OHJDOO\ UHTXLUHV « >E\@ EULQJLQJ WR WKH VXUIDFH WKH IXQGDPHQWDO
SULQFLSOHVDOUHDG\LPPDQHQWLQWKHODZ¶DQGWKDWVXFKGHFLVLRQVDUHµIXOO\GHWHUPLQHG
E\ WKH ODZ¶72 And, as Dyzenhaus notes, Raz argues that such judges would be 
mistaken on the grounds (inter alia) that their stance is incompatible with the concept 
of authority. We can put the detail of that argument to one side.73 The important point 
is to note the two grounds on which Dyzenhaus relies to impugn it. First, he appeals to 
WKHµSROLWLFDORULJLQV¶RIOHJDOSRVLWLYLVP6HFRQGO\KHHIIHFWLYHO\DLPVWKHDUJXPHQW
that has thus far been aimed at positivist accounts of the nature of law DW5D]¶VDFFRXQW
of authority+HQRWHVWKDWWKDWDFFRXQWLVFRQWURYHUVLDODµERQHRI FRQWHQWLRQ¶DQG
then asserts that the solution to the controversy does not lie in conceptual analysis 
EHFDXVHµSROLWLFDOO\SDUWLVDQDFFRXQWVRIWKHDXWKRULW\RIODZKDYHWREHUHFRQVWUXFWHG
JHQHDORJLFDOO\¶74 All of this betrays a refusal to take descriptive claims at face value. 
5D]¶V DUJXPHQW LV H[SOLFLWO\ GHVFULSWLYH VR '\]HQKDXV SRLQWV WRZDUGV WKH
prescriptivism of Hobbes and Bentham as if it infects all other positivistic theory. Raz 
refers to an account of authority, which is also explicitly descriptive, so Dyzenhaus 
moves from the fact that this is controversial to an assertion that it too can really only 
be defended on political terrain. The second limb of the argument from vacuity may 
well be otiose, but it also reveals what is really at stake. When the supportive argument 
LVXQSDFNHGLWEHFRPHVFOHDUWKDW'\]HQKDXV¶REMHFWLRQLVQRWWKDWWKHSRVLWLYLVWVKDYH
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  Dyzenhaus, above n 10, 55±6. 
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  Ibid 46. 
73
  It is summarised in Raz, above n 20, 210±37. 
74
  Dyzenhaus, above n 10, 56. Again, note that in choosing the adjective 
µJHQHDORJLFDOO\¶ '\]HQKDXV DSSHDUV WR EH FODLPLQJ WKDW DQ\ JLYHQ DFFRXQW RI
authority is tied to the political commitments of those responsible for earlier 
articulations of that account. My discussion treats his argument as if he meant 
µSROLWLFDOO\¶LQDZLGHUVHQVHSee also above n 70. Furthermore, in the text I ignore 
the move from accounts of authority tout court to accounts of the authority of law. If 
WKLV VOLS LV DFNQRZOHGJHG LW EHFRPHV FOHDU WKDW '\]HQKDXV¶ DUJXPHQW PLVVHV 5D]
HQWLUHO\ EHFDXVH WKH 5D]LDQ VWDQFH LV GHULYHG IURP WKH IRUPHU DQG '\]HQKDXV¶
argument shifts focus to the latter. 
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not explained themselves. It is that the explanations they have offered are not 
politically prescriptive. 
6RLWVHHPVWKDWWKHµVXVSLFLRXVO\FLUFXODU¶DUJXPHQWLQSOD\LV'\]HQKDXV¶RZQ
UDWKHU WKDQ5D]¶V UHPHPEHU WKDW KLV RYHUDUFKLQJDUJXPHQW LV WKDWGHWDFKPHQW IURP
political commitments renders descriptive positivism vacuous. But when we come to 
XQSDFN ZKDW KH PHDQV E\ µYDFXRXV¶ ZH ILQG WKDW LW PHDQV µGHWDFKHG IURP SROLWLFDO
FRPPLWPHQWV¶6RRQFHDJDLQ'\]HQKDXV¶SRVLWLRQSUHVXSSRVHVUDWKHUWKDQHVWDEOLVKHV
the conclusion it is supposed to support. Properly unpacked, the argument from vacuity 
is the claim that legal positivism is vacuous because of its commitment to political 
neutrality. But it only carries any weight if the reader is already committed to the 
proposition that politically neutral analysis is vacuous. This cannot be established by 
pointing to that neutrality; it depends on the underlying methodological debate about 
the nature of jurisprudence. 
The extent to which Dyzenhaus is relying on ² rather than defending ² an 
underlying account of the methodology of jurisprudence is betrayed by a curious 
feature of his argumentative strategy. Notice that he recognises the possibility that 
participants ² in this case, different judges ² are split over what constitutes the best 
account of the nature of law. So the role of the anti-positivist judge in the story is not to 
disprove legal positivism; it is simply to establish some disagreement ² with the 
positivist judge ² which Dyzenhaus then claims can only be settled by political 
DUJXPHQW6LPLODUO\KHGRHVQ¶WDFWXDOO\GLVDJUHHZLWK5D]¶VDFFRXQWRIDXWKRULW\+H
simply notes that it is controversial in order to introduce the claim that the way to solve 
the controversy is by recourse to normative political argument. 
Certainly, some arguments can be settled only by normative political argument. 
But not all arguments are like this. Dyzenhaus insists that the controversies he 
identifies are the kind that can only be settled by normative argument, but he never 
actually tells us why. Ultimately the success of his arguments depends on this 
underlying problem. And, as we have seen, each of the three arguments considered in 
this section collapse in the same way. So we must now turn to the question of the 
extent to which explaining the nature of law is a politically prescriptive enterprise. 
III. '\]HQKDXV¶LVRODWHGPHWKRGRORJ\ 
6R HDFK RI '\]HQKDXV¶ WKUHH DUJXPHQWV OLQNLQJ OHJDO SRVLWLYLVP WR OHJLVODWLYH
supremacy ultimately collapses into some aspect of the underlying methodological 
debate about the nature of jurisprudence. The three arguments are united by the 
assumption that jurisprudence is properly understood as a prescriptive, rather than 
purely descriptive, enterprise. However, different points emerge from each. The 
argument from authoritarianism tells us that Dyzenhaus presupposes that jurisprudence 
is prescriptive. The argument from irrelevance tells us that Dyzenhaus considers 
prescriptive theory to be aimed at judges and intended to influence the decisions they 
come to in hard cases. The argument from vacuity tells us that Dyzenhaus supposes 
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that the only kinds of arguments that these prescriptions can embody are normative 
political arguments. Taken together, these are the foundation for a very distinctive 
position as regards the nature of jurisprudence and it is unfortunate that it is not 
explicitly defended in Dyzenhaus¶ DUJXPHQWV 7KLV SRVLWLRQ KDV WZR LPSRUWDQW
features. First, Dyzenhaus projects his brand of prescriptivism onto (clearly) 
descriptive works, reading them as if they conformed to his preferred methodology and 
interpreting their claims in that light. Secondly, that brand of prescriptivism is 
remarkably austere both in terms of the kind of arguments that it permits, and the kind 
of beneficial moral consequences that it targets. This section explores these two 
IHDWXUHVRI'\]HQKDXV¶SRVLWLRQDQGRXWOLQHVZKHUe they situate his work with respect 
to theorists that have defended related positions in this debate. No-one has defended a 
position as doubly extreme as the one that lies behind this critique of legal positivism. I 
will suggest that it is untenable. 
A. PROJECTED PRESCRIPTIVISM 
We saw in our discussion of the argument from authoritarianism the conflict between 
the prescriptivism of Dyzenhaus, who appraised legal positivism in terms of the moral 
consequences of espousing it as a theory of law, and the descriptivism of Dickson, for 
whom the success of a theory of law depends on its truth or conceptual soundness. A 
NH\ IHDWXUH RI '\]HQKDXV¶ DUJXPHQW LV WKDW LW WUHDWV DUJXPHQWV GHYHORSHG E\
descriptive theorists as if they were prescriptive. How could this be justified? 
'\]HQKDXV¶ UHMHFWLRQ RI WKH GHVFULSWLYLVW SRVLWLRQ LPSOLHV D UHMHFWLRQ RI LWV
central assumption that there is some truth to be uncovered about the nature of law. So 
the first step to understanding his position requires us to inquire how there could be 
multiple competing truths about the nature of law. As we saw, above, the conclusion of 
WKH DUJXPHQW IURP DXWKRULWDULDQLVP ZHOFRPHG 'ZRUNLQ¶V µDFFRPSOLVKPHQW¶ LQ
µDWWHPSWLQJ WR UHVWRUH OHJDO SKLORVRSK\ WR DQ H[DPLQDWLRQ RI LWV SURSHU SUDJPDWLF
roots¶75 For him, then, all conceptual inquiry about law is prescriptive. This 
SUHVXSSRVHVWKDWWKHUHLVQRµIDFWRIWKHPDWWHU¶DQGWKDWWKHFRQFHSWRIODZLVIOXLGVXFK
that legal theorists have a choice between competing conceptions of law that are all 
faithful descriptions of the institution itself. Taken at face value, this is a position that 
risks collapse into a species of unsustainable scepticism, because if all we can say 
about law is prescriptive then it is impossible for us to agree, descriptively, on what we 
are arguing about in the first place. With this in mind it is a shame that Dyzenhaus does 
not provide an account of what it is about law that makes legal theory uniformly 
prescriptive. In order to remedy this defect, he would have to defend at least one 
descriptive claim ² his description of whatever feature of the institution of law makes 
it amenable only to prescriptive (and not descriptive) analysis. Dworkin, on whom 
Dyzenhaus superficially relies, does of course have such an argument for his stance 
that legal theory is prescriptive, which rests on at least one prior descriptive claim: that 
law is a member of a special category of social practices, interpretive practices, that 
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can only bear prescriptive theorising.76 But Dyzenhaus distances himself from this 
ZLGHUFRPPLWPHQWRI'ZRUNLQ¶VDQGDVDUHVXOWWKHIRXQGDWLRQVRIKLVFODLPWKDWOHJDO
theory is exclusively prescriptive are unclear.77 
One possibility is developed by Frederick Schauer. Law, he notes, is a socially 
constructed concept and, as sXFK µLWZRXOGEHRSHQIRU WKHSHRSOHZKRVHFROOHFWLYH
beliefs and actions construct [the concept of law] to construct [it] in one way rather 
WKDQ DQRWKHU¶78 Furthermore, the socially constructed concept of law is not static. 
5DWKHULWµFKDQJHVRYHUWLPHand is best understood as emerging through a process of 
FRQWLQXRXVFRQVWUXFWLRQDQGUHFRQVWUXFWLRQ¶79 $FFRUGLQJO\µLWZRXOGEHDPLVWDNHWR
DVVXPH WKDW WKH FRQFHSW RI ODZ PXVW DOZD\V EH ZKDW LW QRZ LV¶80 This framework 
makes space for both descriptive and prescriptive theorising about the nature of law. 
6FKDXHU FKDUDFWHULVHV GHVFULSWLYH MXULVSUXGHQFH DV DGRSWLQJ µD VQDSVKRW DSSURDFK WR
IUHH]LQJDQLPDJHRIDFRQWLQXRXVO\PRYLQJHQWLW\¶DQGFRQWUDVWVLWZLth prescriptive 
MXULVSUXGHQFHLQWHQGHGWRµRIIHUUHDVRQVDQGDUJXPHQWVZK\DFXOWXUHVKRXOGVWHHUDQG
VKDSH«LWVFRQFHSWRIODZLQWKLVGLUHFWLRQUDWKHUWKDQWKDW¶81 This framework creates 
the logical space for two types of legal theories that are apt to be judged according to 
consequentialist and descriptive criteria respectively. But this model cannot explain 
'\]HQKDXV¶DSSURDFKEHFDXVHWKHGLYLVLRQWKDWLWHQYLVDJHVGHSHQGVRQZKDW6FKDXHU
FDOOV WKH µYRLFH¶ DGRSWHG E\ GLIIHUHQW OHJDO WKHRULHV VRPH DUH descriptive, some are 
prescriptive, and the choice is determined by the enterprise on which the author 
understands themselves to be embarking.82 The positivism which Dyzenhaus targets 
VSHDNVLQWKHYRLFHRIGHVFULSWLYHMXULVSUXGHQFHµWKDWRIGHVFULELQJDQG explaining the 
FRQFHSW RI ODZ¶83 So even though Schauer acknowledges both the possibility and 
importance of prescriptive jurisprudence, he does not do so in a way that explains 
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'\]HQKDXV¶ EUDQG RI SUHVFULSWLYLVP 7KDW UHTXLUHV D IUDPHZRUN WKDW ZRXOG OLFHQce 
treating self-consciously descriptive theory as if it were really prescriptive. 
$UHFXUUHQWWKHPHLQ'\]HQKDXV¶ZRUNPLJKWSRLQWWRZDUGVVXFKDIUDPHZRUN
That theme is disagreement. Dyzenhaus persistently treats the existence of judges who 
disagree with the legal positivist analysis of hard cases as a phenomenon that poses a 
challenge to legal positivism as a whole. Indeed, these judges are something of a 
leitmotif in his work.84 Although Dyzenhaus never articulates the connection between 
these judges and the prescriptive nature of legal theory, Liam Murphy, who shares his 
commitment to prescriptive theory, has developed an argument that could fill the gap. 
He outlines a disagreement-based conception of politically prescriptive jurisprudence 
in his article The Political Question of the Concept of Law.85 
As Murphy points out, it is clear that lawyers often argue and judges often 
decide cases on moral or political grounds. The conceptual question, then, on which 
legal philosophers disagree, is whether this kiQGRIµDSSHDOWRSROLWLFDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQV
by lawyers and judges is properly understood as part of an argument about what the 
ODZDOUHDG\LV¶86 For Murphy, this disagreement is the foundation of an argument in 
favour of prescriptive theorising. He argues WKDWLWZLOOµVXUYLYH«DEVWUDFWUHIOHFWLRQ
DERXW WKH YHU\ LGHD RI ODZ¶ E\ ZKLFK KH PHDQV WKDW WKH GLVDJUHHPHQW ZLOO QRW EH
VHWWOHGRQH ZD\ RU WKH RWKHU E\ D SKLORVRSKLFDO LQYHVWLJDWLRQ LQWR µZKDW ZH DOUHDG\
VKDUHE\ZD\RIDFRQFHSWRIODZ¶87 The disagreement will persist and another way to 
VHWWOH LW PXVW EH IRXQG 0XUSK\¶V SURSRVHG VROXWLRQ LV WR PRYH WKH GHEDWH RQWR
political terrain. The reason the disagreement about our equivocal concept matters, he 
argues, is the extent to which acceptance of one conception of law or another affects 
SROLWLFDO SUDFWLFH $FFRUGLQJO\ µ>W@KH ZD\ WR UHVROYH WKH « GLVDJUHHPHQW « PXVW
therefore be to evaluate the practical and political reasons that they offer for their 
UHVSHFWLYHSRVLWLRQV¶88 Here, then, we have excavated some plausible foundations for 
'\]HQKDXV¶ SURMHFWHG SUHVFULSWLYLVP :KHUH '\]HQKDXV QHYHU MXVWLILHV WKH OHDS WR
prescriptive debate, Murphy provides a justification which is compatible with 
'\]HQKDXV¶DSSURDFKDQLPDWHGDVLWLVE\WKHWKHPHRIGLVDJUHHPHQW$QG0XUSK\¶V
account of the boundary between descriptive and prescriptive theory has the potential 
to licence departure from the self-XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIKLV WDUJHWV6FKDXHU¶V IUDPHZRUN
was tied to the voice adopted by the theorist, and so demands fidelity to their 
LQWHQWLRQV%XW0XUSK\¶VLVWLHGWRWKHTXHVWLRQEHLQJWDFNOHGDQGVRDSSHDUVWRSHUPLW
                                                     
84
  Note how these judges are central to the arguments from irrelevance and vacuity. Cf 
Dworkin, who makes what he calls theoretical disagreement, and an allegation that 
legal positivists cannot explain it, the focus of his theory of law in /DZ¶V (PSLUH
above n 62.  
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  /LDP0XUSK\µThe Political Question of the Concept of Law¶ in Jules Coleman (ed), 
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imposing a prescriptive reading on arguments about any question which turn out to 
need tackling prescriptively.  
7KLV DFFRXQW OLFHQFHV '\]HQKDXV¶ PRYH WR Srescriptive argument as the 
disagreement over how best to account for what happens in hard cases has survived 
DEVWUDFW UHIOHFWLRQ %XW 0XUSK\¶V DFFRXQW RI WKH ERUGHUOLQHEHWZHHQ GHVFULSWLYH DQG
SUHVFULSWLYHWKHRU\LVOLNH6FKDXHU¶VQRWDQDFFRXQWRIZKDW methodology to read into 
previously developed arguments. It is an argument about how we ought to develop 
those arguments in the first place. So it does not on its face provide a licence for the 
enterprise of projecting prescriptive methodology onto descriptive arguments. If 
0XUSK\¶VFRQFOXVLRQWKDWDUJXPHQWDERXWWKHQDWXUHRIODZLVQHFHVVDULO\SUHVFULSWLYH
is sound, then it obviously has ramifications for descriptive theory. But the automatic 
imputation of any particular prescriptive commitments to the authors of descriptive 
theories is not among those ramifications. As Waldron notes in his appeal for more 
prescriptive positivist theorising, legal positivists are interested in a cluster of different 
versions of positivity and can plausibly be understood to be motivated by a variety of 
values.89 But, he also notes: 
Those who resist the general jurisprudential methodology 
associated with normative positivism may do so because they 
fear that a particular one of [several possible] interests « is 
being foisted on legal positivists ² as though they must all have 
the programmatic interests that, say, Bentham or Hobbes had, or 
not count as real positivists at all.90  
This, I think, is what Dyzenhaus does. A substantial proportion of the enterprise 
of contemporary jurisprudence proceeds as if there is a fact of the matter about the 
nature of law. It is possible that this foundation is mistaken. It would be one thing for 
Dyzenhaus to challenge this orthodoxy with a concrete argument that the concept of 
law is, in fact, indeterminate on this point. It is quite another for him to both 
presuppose this radical position without offering a single argument in its favour and 
project that position onto arguments which do not share its methodological 
assumptions. Suppose, however, that he is correct. In the next section we will see that 
the arguments from irrelevance and vacuity highlight how his position becomes yet 
more distinctive because he adopts an extremely narrow view of what constitutes 
prescriptive jurisprudence.  
B. THE AUSTERITY OF DYZENHA86¶35(6&5,37,9,60 
,QKLVH[FKDQJHZLWK.UDPHU'\]HQKDXVH[SODLQVµWKHGRXEOHVHQVH«UHTXLUHGIRUD
SRVLWLRQ WR EH SURSHUO\ VXEVWDQWLYH¶ ,W PXVW EH µEDVHG LQ SROLWLFDO PRUDOLW\¶ DQG
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µGHVLJQHGWRKDYHDQHIIHFWRQSUDFWLFH¶91 We will first consider the two requirements 
in turn. 
:KLOVW '\]HQKDXV¶ IRUPXODWLRQ RI KLV PHWKRGRORJ\ VHHPV YHU\ JHQHUDO KLV
DUJXPHQWVDFWXDOO\HQYLVDJHRQO\RQHNLQGRIµHIIHFWRQSUDFWLFH¶WKDWWKHWKHRULVWQHHG
consider. His critique of legal positivism is founded on argument about the effect that 
theories have on the way in which judges decide hard cases. This has important 
ramifications for the way in which the argument from authoritarianism sits in the wider 
debate about the possible consequences of legal positivism. 
Some defences of legal positivism seem to engage directly with the argument 
from authoritarianism by pointing to the morally beneficial consequences of adopting 
the positivist perspective on law. The most famous of these arguments was developed 
by Hart in his debate with Fuller, and echoes of it remain in The Concept of Law, 
despite his shift to a primarily descriptive approach. In summary, Hart argued that legal 
SRVLWLYLVP LV WKH DSSURDFK PRVW OLNHO\ WR µOHDG WR D VWLIIHQLQJ UHVLVWDQFH WR HYLO¶ Ey 
µPDNLQJPDQFOHDU-VLJKWHGLQFRQIURQWLQJWKHRIILFLDODEXVHRISRZHU¶92 This argument 
has been adopted or endorsed by several contemporary theorists.93 But although this 
argument relies on the beneficial moral consequences of positivism, and so seems to 
engage with Dyzenhaus, it is not about how judges should decide cases. It is about the 
attitudes that legal positivism engenders in the citizenry in general. This explains the 
VWUDQJH WXUQ WKDW '\]HQKDXV VHHPV WR WDNH DW WKH FXOPLQDWLRQ RI KLV DUWLFOH µThe 
Genealogy of Legal Positivism¶ ZKHUHKHZHOFRPHVZKDWKHFDOOVWKHµQHR-Benthamite 
UHYLYDO¶ LQ OHJDOSRVLWLYLVP 94 Here, Dyzenhaus is referring to an important trend in 
contemporary legal positivism which is politically prescriptive, which is grounded in 
the value of legislative supremacy and which advocates for the marginalisation of the 
role of judges.95 +HFHOHEUDWHVWKLVµUHYLYDO¶EHFDXVHLWEULQJVZLWKLWWKHSRVVLELOLW\RI
µFRQVWUXFWLYH¶RUµSURGXFWLYHHQJDJHPHQW¶ZLWKKLVRZQEUDQGRIDQWL-majoritarian anti-
positivism.96 Note, however, that it is not simply prescriptive positivism which is 
revived in this trend. The persistence of the Hartian prescriptive argument through the 
ZRUNRIDXWKRUVOLNH0DF&RUPLFN6FKDXHUDQG0XUSK\PHDQVWKDWQRVXFKµUHYLYDO¶
is needed. But Dyzenhaus overlooks this tradition. Rather what he welcomes is the 
revival of the specific form of prescriptive theory that corresponds to his criteria for 
µSURSHUO\ VXEVWDQWLYH¶ ² that is, theory based in political morality and aimed at 
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  Dyzenhaus, above n 9, 717. Note that Dyzenhaus presents the two requirements in 
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  Hart, above n 25, 210. 
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  Eg, Murphy DERYH Q  1HLO 0DF&RUPLFN µ$ 0RUDOLVWLF &DVH IRU $-Moralistic 
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  Dyzenhaus, above n 10, 61. 
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  See especially. Tom Campbell, The Legal Theory of Ethical Positivism (Dartmouth, 
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  Dyzenhaus, above n 10, section 4.  
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influencing how judges decide cases. Dyzenhaus is of course aware of the Hartian 
strand of prescriptivism.97 %XW KLV DUJXPHQWV GR QRW HQJDJH ZLWK LW DV LW GRHVQ¶W
conform to his extremely narrow conception of substantive legal theory. And 
'\]HQKDXVGRHVQ¶W articulate his vision of this restriction on what counts as properly 
substantive theory. Schauer, on the other hand, explicitly discusses the issue: 
7KH FKRLFH EHWZHHQ SRVLWLYLVP DQG LWV RSSRVLWLRQ « DVVXPLQJ
WKHFKRLFHWREHLQVWUXPHQWDO«PD\GHSHQGRQ the situation of 
the chooser and the uses to which the choice must be put. 
)XOOHU¶V DWWDFN RQ SRVLWLYLVP FRPHV IURP D SHUVSHFWLYH WKDW
SUHVXSSRVHVDFKRRVHUWUDSSHGLQVLGHWKHOHJDOV\VWHP«0XFK
RI WUDGLWLRQDO SRVLWLYLVP KRZHYHU « GRHV QRW VKDUH )XOOHU¶V 
presupposition.98 
The case for restricting our choice to the perspective of the participant, like 
Dyzenhaus (and, according to Schauer, Fuller) seems impossible to make. If we are 
dealing with the beneficial moral consequences of endorsing one or other theory of 
law, then surely all the moral consequences must be counted. So suppose that 
Dyzenhaus is correct that positivism encourages authoritarian judging, and Hart, 
Schauer, MacCormick and Murphy are correct that positivism encourages citizens to 
subject tKHODZWRFULWLFDOPRUDOVFUXWLQ\'\]HQKDXV¶DQWL-positivism does not prevail 
by default. He must justify why his beneficial moral consequences outweigh theirs, 
and this cannot be achieved by simply stipulating a very austere account of properly 
prescriptive theorising. 
:HFDQQRZWXUQWRWKHILQDODVSHFWRI'\]HQKDXV¶GLVWLQFWLYHDSSURDFKWROHJDO
theory. He presupposes that when theorists come to choose between competing 
conceptions of law, then the only kind of arguments that can come into play are those 
based in political morality. This was most clear in the argument from vacuity, where 
vacuity was a label applied to jurisprudential argument supported by arguments from 
RXWVLGH SROLWLFDO PRUDOLW\ %XW UHFDOO 0XUSK\¶V DUJXPHQW LQ IDYRXU RI SUHVFULSWLYH
thHRU\ ZKLFK ZDV WKH FORVHVW ZH FRXOG ILQG WR DQ H[SODQDWLRQ IRU '\]HQKDXV¶
insistence on prescriptivism. Faced with persistent disagreement, Murphy does not 
argue that the way to decide is by exclusively political argument. Rather, he specifies 
that we shoXOGGHFLGHE\HYDOXDWLQJµWKHpractical DQGSROLWLFDOUHDVRQV¶99 in favour of 
the respective positions in the debate. In dropping the possibility that non-political 
reasons might contribute to our choice between competing legal theories, Dyzenhaus 
imposes yet another significant but unexplained restriction on the way in which 
jurisprudence should proceed. There are many practical reasons that might legitimately 
IHDWXUH LQ RXU FKRLFH &RQVLGHU IRU H[DPSOH %ULDQ /HLWHU¶V UHFHQW VXPPDU\ RI
theoretical desiderata: 
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University Press, 1999). 
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Here are three familiar theoretical desiderata often thought 
relevant:  
Simplicity. We prefer simpler explanations to more complex 
ones, all else being equal (that is, without cost to other 
theoretical desiderata).  
Consilience. We prefer more comprehensive explanations, 
explanations that make sense of more different kinds of things, 
to explanations that seem too narrowly tailored to one kind of 
datum.  
Conservatism. We prefer explanations that leave more of our 
other well-confirmed beliefs and theories intact to those that 
GRQ¶W all else being equal (that is, without cost to other 
theoretical desiderata).100 
&OHDUO\ WKLV OLVW LV QRW H[KDXVWLYH '\]HQKDXV¶ LQVLVWHQFH RQ SROLWLFDO
prescriptivism has the effect of excluding these ² and related ² issues from our 
criteria for the success of competing legal theories. At the very least, these meta-
theoretical values must come into play if we are forced to choose between rival 
theories that are inseparable on political grounds. Perhaps they even compete with the 
SROLWLFDODUJXPHQWVWKHPVHOYHV:KLFKHYHULVWKHFDVH'\]HQKDXV¶EODQNHWH[FOXVLRQ
of this kind of non-political value from legal theory is odd.  
The cumulative effect of the various unargued methodological moves that 
Dyzenhaus makes is that he is methodologically isolated in the field of legal theory: 
isolated both in the austerity of his prescriptivism and in his practice of projecting that 
methodology onto descriptive writings by engaging with them as if they share it. I have 
struggled in this section to provide fully articulated arguments that his methodology is 
wrong. Indeed, it could well prove to be correct. But it is a position that clashes with 
the arguments of theorists who have explicitly considered these issues at every turn. 
The final section will explore an example of the peculiar consequences that this 
PHWKRGRORJLFDODSSURDFKKDVLQWKHFRQWH[WRI'\]HQKDXV¶ WUHDWPHQWRIRQHGLVFUHWH
issue.  
C. THE HOBBESIAN RED HERRING 
2QH RI WKH PRVW UHPDUNDEOH DVSHFWV RI '\]HQKDXV¶ H[FKDQJH ZLWK .Uamer is the 
account that Dyzenhaus deploys of the jurisprudential disagreement between Hart and 
5D]FRQFHUQLQJWKHFRUUHFWDFFRXQWRIZKDWLWPHDQVWRVD\WKDWRIILFLDOVµDFFHSW¶LQ
+DUW¶VWHFKQLFDOVHQVHWKHUXOHRIUHFRJQLWLRQ101 '\]HQKDXV¶GLVFXVVLRQRf that debate 
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  %ULDQ /HLWHU µ([SODLQLQJ 7KHRUHWLFDO 'LVDJUHHPHQW
 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 76 University of 
Chicago Law Review 1215, 1239. 
101
  2Q+DUW¶VFRQILQHGXVHRI µDFFHSW¶DVD WHUPRIDUW UHIHUULQJ WR WKHDGRSWLRQRI WKH
LQWHUQDOSRLQWRIYLHZVHH$GDP7XFNHUµ8QFHUWDLQW\LQWKH5XOHRI5HFRJQLWLRQDQG
LQ WKH 'RFWULQH RI 3DUOLDPHQWDU\ 6RYHUHLJQW\¶ 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  Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 61. 
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is remarkable because, as Kramer notes, it appears to bear no resemblance to the texts 
he purports to be discussing, as a brief overview will illustrate.102 Raz argued that the 
attitude of acceptance necessarily expresses either the belief that the rule in question is 
PRUDOO\MXVWLILHGRUWKHSUHWHQFHRUµDYRZDO¶RIVXFKDEHOLHI103 +DUWGLVDJUHHGµ7R
P\PLQG¶KHDUJXHGµWKHLQFOXVLRQRIWKLVDVDQHFHVVDU\FRPSRQHQWRIDFFHSWDQFHLV
D PLVWDNH¶104 Dyzenhaus cites, and claims to be discussing, +DUW¶V WZR PDLQ
GLVFXVVLRQVRIWKHSUREOHPLQZKLFK+DUWVWDNHVRXWWZRUHDVRQVIRUUHMHFWLQJ5D]¶V
YLHZZLWKVRPHFODULW\)LUVWKHFRQVLGHUV LW WRSUHVHQWµDQXQUHDOLVWLFSLFWXUHRIWKH
ZD\ LQZKLFK«MXGJHV HQYLVDJH WKHLU WDVN¶105 Secondly, he argues that Raz is led 
astray by his otherwise distinct argument that normative statements express the 
existence of objective reasons to act in the way they require.106 Dyzenhaus reports this 
argument in terms that appear foreign to anyone who has read the original. He 
LGHQWLILHVWZRVWUDQGVLQ+DUW¶VDUJXPHQW 
The first is methodological, that to look beyond the fact that 
MXGJHV GR « WR ZK\ « PLJKW LPSRUW WKHLU PRUDO SHUVSHFWLYHV
into the positivist conception of law, which then might cease to 
be general and value free. The second is the concern about the 
path ending in a Hobbesian notion of a prior moral obligation to 
obey the law.107 
Dyzenhaus goes on to characterise the contours of the second argument as 
IROORZV)LUVWKHUHGXFHV5D]¶VDUJXPHQWWRWKHFODLPWKDWSarticipants in legal practice 
µVHQVH WKDW WKHUH DUH PRUDO UHDVRQV IRU REHGLHQFH¶6HFRQGO\ KH QRWHV WKDW WKLV LV D
FODLPWKDWµPXVWEHEDVHGRQDQDUJXPHQWRISROLWLFDOWKHRU\¶)LQDOO\KHREVHUYHVWKDW
WKLVDUJXPHQWPXVWLQWXUQOHDGµWRWKHFRQFOXVLRQthat there is a prior moral obligation 
WRREH\WKHODZ¶108  
)URP DQ\ SHUVSHFWLYH '\]HQKDXV¶ DUJXPHQW LV SHUSOH[LQJ109 But for present 
purposes, its most important feature is that it simply does not correspond to the debate 
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  )RU H[DPSOH KLV H[SRVLWLRQ RYHUORRNV RQH KDOI RI 5D]¶V DUJXPHQW QDPHO\ WKH
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he purports to be discussing and tKHWH[WVWRZKLFKKLVFLWDWLRQVSRLQW+DUW¶VUHDVRQV
IRUGLVPLVVLQJ5D]¶VVWDQFHRXWOLQHGDERYHKDYHQRWKLQJWRGRZLWKµPHWKRGRORJ\¶
and there is no mention of Hobbes or of prior obligations to obey the law. By this 
stage, Kramer had lost patience witK'\]HQKDXV+DYLQJSRLQWHGRXWWKDW'\]HQKDXV¶
µFLWDWLRQ « VLPSO\ PDNHV FOHDU WKDW +DUW QRZKHUH H[SUHVVHG WKH PLVJLYLQJV ZKLFK
'\]HQKDXV « LPSXWHV WR KLP¶ KH VXPPDULO\ GLVPLVVHV '\]HQKDXV¶ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ
µ7KHXQHDVHVXSSRVHGO\IHOWE\+DUWLVDILJPHQWRI'\]HQKDXV¶LPDJLQDWLRQ¶KHQRWHV
'\]HQKDXV¶SHUVLVWHQWUHIHUHQFHVWR+REEHVDUHKHFRQFOXGHVµQRWKLQJPRUHWKDQDUHG
KHUULQJ¶110 
+RZHYHULIZHWDNHLQWRDFFRXQW'\]HQKDXV¶FRQFHSWLRQRIOHJDOSKLORVRSK\DV
outlined above, we can construct a more undHUVWDQGLQJ UHDGLQJ RI '\]HQKDXV¶
argument. It derives from his projection of austere, prescriptive arguments onto the 
original texts, so that the arguments of Raz and Hart are being read as exhortations to 
those in legal practice. With this in mind, DyzenhDXV¶DFFRXQWRI WKHLUGHEDWHKDVD
FRKHUHQFHZKLFK.UDPHURYHUORRNHG5D]¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWMXGJHVHLWKHUEHOLHYHLQWKH
legitimacy of law or (at least) appear to do so is transformed into an argument that 
judges should believe in the legitimacy of law. And then it makes sense for Dyzenhaus 
WR DUJXH WKDW 5D]¶V VWDQFH PXVW XOWLPDWHO\ EH JURXQGHG LQ DQ DUJXPHQW RI SROLWLFDO
morality that leads to the defence of an obligation to obey the law. For why else would 
Raz be exhorting the judiciary to believe in the laZ¶V PRUDO OHJLWLPDF\" 7KLV
understanding even holds if, unlike Dyzenhaus, we do not allow the second component 
RI5D]¶VVWDQFH² WKDWWKRVHMXGJHVZKRGRQ¶WPRUDOO\HQGRUVHWKHODZDWOHDVWSUHWHQG
to do so ² to drop out of the picture. For there is no reason to exhort judges to at least 
pretend to believe in the moral legitimacy of the law unless we are armed with a prior 
political argument that they ought to do so. But, as I hope is already becoming clear, 
this is not a legitimate reading of the disagreement between Hart and Raz. Hart and 
Raz were engaged in a wider debate about the normativity of law, and in one guise this 
IRFXVHGRQWKHPHDQLQJRIMXGJHV¶VWDWHPHQWVZKHQWKH\DVVHUWWKHH[LVWHQFHRIOHJDO
obligations in delivering their judgments.111 For Hart, such statements have a special 
PHDQLQJ MXGJHV µPD\PHDQ WRVSHDN LQD WHFKQLFDOO\FRQILQHGZD\¶ LQZKLFK WKHLU
expression of legal duties only makes sense in light of the legal context in which they 
are spoken. On this view, legal obligations are a distinct species of obligation. For Raz, 
on the other hand, asserting a legal obligation is to assert the existence of a moral 
obligation. The truth or falsity of this assertion is, of course, a further question. 
'\]HQKDXV¶ HFFHQWULF LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI RQH facet of this debate transforms it. He 
effectively precludes Raz from going on to argue, as he in fact does, that those 
assertions are often false by alleging that his stance must be derived from the unstated 
belief that they are usually true. But in doing this, Dyzenhaus renders himself unable to 
claim that his interpretation displays even the bare minimum of fidelity to the 
                                                                                                                                        
on. For a discussion of some of the substantive flaws in the argument Dyzenhaus 
attributes to Hart, see Kramer, above n 21, especially 698 and following. 
110
  Kramer, above n 21, 699. 
111
  6HH +DUW DERYH Q   IRU +DUW¶V H[SUHVVLRQ RI WKH GHEDWH LQ WHUPV RI WKH
meaning RIMXGJHV¶VWDWHPHQWVZKHQDSSO\LQJWKHODZ 
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DUJXPHQW WKDW KH SXUSRUWV WR EH GLVFXVVLQJ 7KLV SUREOHP DURVH LQ '\]HQKDXV¶
discussion of only one small debate ² a matter of only several pages ² that was 
perfectly intelligible before he imputed unstated and inconsistent political undertones 
WR5D]¶VFRQWULEXWLRQ 
IV. Conclusion 
7KLV DUWLFOH KDV H[DPLQHG 'DYLG '\]HQKDXV¶ GLVWLQFWLYH DUJXPHQWDWLYH WHFKQLTXH RI
connecting undesirable political phenomena with the arguments and the influence of 
legal positivism. This technique has the surprising consequence of casting those who 
oppose Dyzenhaus in the debate about the nature of law as also thereby his (sometimes 
unwilling) opponents in various substantive political arguments ² about the scope of 
state power, the limits of judicial review, what we can learn from terrible injustices like 
apartheid, and more. But the legal positivism that Dyzenhaus deploys in this way is 
often unrecognisable WRLWVSURSRQHQWV,KDYHVKRZQWKDWWKLVLVEHFDXVH'\]HQKDXV¶
distinctive conception of legal philosophy drives his understanding of legal positivism 
at every turn, and that acknowledging this is the only way in which his (sometimes 
idiosyncratic) understandings of positivism can make any sense. The argument 
explored in the previous section is truly remarkable. And the broader arguments that I 
have canvassed in the rest of this article are simply that situation writ large. Dyzenhaus 
faces a double obstacle if his arguments are to succeed. First, he must establish that his 
radical view on the methodology of legal positivism, which is a strikingly austere 
version of prescriptivism, is sound. Secondly, he must establish that it is legitimate to 
project that methodology onto writings which do not follow it, by reading legal 
theories that do not correspond to that methodology as if they do, by imputing 
PRWLYDWLRQV DQG PHDQLQJV WR WKHP WKDW WKH\ GRQ¶W FRQWDLQ EXW WKDWKH EHOLHYHV WKH\
ought to. I do not believe that either of these obstacles can be overcome. 
  
